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It  is  no  longer  disputed  that  trade  has  a  vital  role  to  play  in 
development.  The  developing  countries  themselves  are  more  aware  of 
this  than  anyone.  A  number  of  Asian  developing  countries,  in 
particular,  have  followed  a  strategy  of  export-led  growth;  the 
majority,  notably  the  Latin  American  countries,  as  part  of  the  reforms 
undertaken  in  connection  with  the  restructuring  of  their  debt,  were 
actively  involved  in  the  successful  outcome  of  the  Uruguay  Round  and 
will  become  full  members  of  the  WTO. 
Nevertheless,  problems  remain.  Genuine  integration  into  the 
international  trading  system  entails  the  prospect  of  generous  market 
access  at  an  early  stage,  but  the  Uruguay  Round  results  will  be 
implemented  only  gradually,  and  a  number  of  tariff  barriers  will 
remain.  Also,  much  trade  today  is carried out  via  joint enterprises or 
big  multinationals  and  in  any  case  demands  sophisticated  marketing, 
finance,  telecommunications  and  transport  back-up.  Some  developing 
countries  - if  such  they  can  still  be  called  - have  succeeded  in 
plugging their economies  into the global  trade  and  production networks, 
but  the majority are  not  at  that  stage  and  even  in the  more  advanced of 
these  countries  export  diversification  is still  a  necessity,  given  the 
existence of barely-developed sectors  and  regions  of  great  poverty. 
The  Community  aims,  in  GATT  and  in  its  own  development  activities,  to 
integrate  the  developing  and  transitional  countries  into  the 
international  trading system. 
One  pillar  of  its  strategy  is  the  GSP,  backed  by  special  cooperation 
arrangements. 
The  GSP  offers  developing  countries  tariff  n~dttctiuns  en: 
duty-free  access  for  their  manufactured  exports 
agricultural exports  as  well.  It is 
i 11  some  cusl'H 
and  certain 
1°)  a  tariff  instrument  it operates  purely at  the  level  of  tariffs 
which,  with  a  few  sectoral  exceptions,  are  now  very  far  from  being  the 
main barrier to trade. - 2  -
2°)  autonomous  :  preferences  are  granted  by  the  Community  under  a 
special  GATT  enabling  clause  designed  to  ensure  the  system  is  non-
discriminatory. 
3°)  And  the  GSP  is  complementary to GATT.  While  in the past it may 
have  been  perceived  as  an  alternative  to  GATT,  it  is  now  a  back-up 
rather  than  a  substitute for  the multilateral  liberalization of  trade. 
The  Commission  drew  attention  to  these  three  factors  in  its  July  1990 
Communication  to  the  Council.  Since  that  time,  in  addition  to  the 
conclusion  of  the  Uruguay  Round,  other  major  changes  have  taken  place 
which  put  the  global  economy  and  development  issues  as  a  whole  in  a 
different perspective. 
In  the  first  place,  much  of  the  additional  development  aid  is 
currently being channelled  towards  the  former  Communist  countries  to 
help  them  make  the  transition to  the  market  economy. 
Second,  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  has  given  a  fresh  impetus  to 
the  Community's  development  policy  in  the  context  of  the  Union's 
foreign  policy.  Article  130u  includes  among  the  prime  objectives  of 
that  policy  "sustainable  economic  and  social  development"  and  "the 
smooth  and  gradual  integration of  the  developing  countries  into  the 
world  economy". 
There  are  therefore  two  priorities  for  the  GSP  for  the  decade 
1995-2004.  First,  although it has  traditionally come  under Article  113, 
the  GSP  is  a  tool  of  development  and  must  thus  be  directed  chiefly at 
the  neediest  - i.e.  the  poorest  - countries.  The  GSP  must  be  placed  at 
the  service  of  development  in  the  broader  sense,  embracing  social  and 
environmental  concerns  and  based  on  a  coherent  economic  strategy, 
including  the  IMF/World  Bank-sponsored  adjustment  programmes.  And  the 
GSP  must  complement  GATT,  i.e.  foster  the  integration of  the  developing 
countries  into the  international  economy  and  the  WTO. 
What  this  means  is  that  the  GSP,  like  any other  cooperation  instrument, 
has  a  transitional  function:  preferences,  like  aid,  are  granted 
commensurate  to  need  and  should  be  phased  out  when  the  need  is  judged 
no  longer to  exist. 
THE  CURRENT  GSP:  REPORT 
Many  of  the  trends  in  GSP  use  noted  in  the  Commission's  July 1990 
Communication  on  the  ten-year  guidelines  (COM(90)  329  final)  have  been 
confirmed  into  the  1990s.  The  inclusion  of  new  countries  (the  central 
and  eastern  European  countries,  Baltic  states  and  CIS  countries)  and 
the  introduction  of  special  preferential  arrangements  for  four  Andean -3-
countries  (from  1990)  and  the  Central  American  countries  (from  1991) 
considerably  increased  the  level  of  imports  under  GSP,  which  totalled 
ECU  30.1 billion in  1991  and  ECU  27.5 billion in  1992,  as  the  following 
table  shows: 
Community  imports  from 
GSP  beneficiary countries 
million  ECU 
Total  Imports  Imports  subject  Eligible  Admitted  under 
to duty  for  GSP  GSP 
1981  99  675.0  27  575.5  21  470.8  8  063.1 
1986  80  917.2  46  108.9  31  574.5  11  289.1 
1990  112  494.2  69  064.0  49  147.2  21  403.9 
1991  127  856.9  83  847.8  63  485.4  30  081.3 
1992  115  130.2  77  057.7  60  488.5  27  485.1 
The  apparent  drop  in  imports  under  the  GSP  in  1992  is explained by  the  entry 
into  force  of  the  Europe  Agreements  between  the  Community  and  the  central 
and  eastern  European  countries,  which  thereby  lost  their  GSP  entitlement 
(though  South  Korea  reappeared  on  the  list  of  beneficiaries  that  year, 
having earlier been  suspended because  of its discriminatory practices  in the 
field of intellectual property rights) . 
On  the  whole  the  product  coverage  and  utilization  rate  of  the  Community 
scheme  was  again  relatively  high  in  1992,  with  78.5%  of  dutiable  imports 
from  beneficiary  countries  covered  by  the  scheme,  and  35.6%  of  dutiable 
imports  actually  admi-tted  under  the  preferential  arrangements  (the 
utilization rate)  - figures  which  easily sustain  a  comparison  with  those  of 
the  United  States  and  Japan.  Overall,  take-up  of  GSP  has  improved 
considerably  from  the  levels  recorded  in  the  early  1980s.  Even  after  1990, 
at  a  time  of  weak  domestic  demand  in  the  Community  and  intensified external 
competition,  GSP  access  continued  to  grow  briskly,  though  not  so  much  in 
sensitive  sectors,  reflecting  implement at  ion  of  the  product/country 
differentiation  policy.  The  percentage  of  dutiable  imports  admitted  on 
preferential  terms  increased  from  29.2%  in  1981  to  35.6%  in 1992.  However, 
the  policy of  product  differentiation  adopted  in  the  1980s  and  the  growing 
competitiveness of  the  developing  countries  was  reflected by  a  sharp rise in 
the  number  of tariff quotas  and ceilings.  The  number  of  duties  reintroduced - 4  -
on  products  subject  to  ceilings  was  172  in  1992,  compared  with  76  in  1986. 
There  were  189  individual  quotas  for  industrial products  in  1993,  as  against 
116  in  1988  and  91  in  1981. 
Despite  the  practical  problems,  the  product/country  differentiation  policy 
has  had  an  effect:  countries  such  as  China,  Thailand,  Indonesia  and 
Malaysia  have  seen  a  marked  growth  in  their  GSP  exports  to  the  Community  in 
recent  years  in  parallel  with  a  relative  decline  for  the  most  highly-
competitive  countries  like  Hong  Kong  and  South  Korea,  and  have  in  turn 
become  extremely competitive  in certain sectors. 
Asia  is  far  and  away  the  major  GSP  beneficiary,  accounting  for  almost  70%  of 
the preferential  advantage  in  1992.  Within  the  region  the  lion's  share  goes 
to  China,  which  takes  nearly  25%  of total  GSP  benefits,  more  or  less  in line 
with  its  share  of  dutiable  imports  (20%).  The  large  proportion  of  GSP 
preferences  taken  up  by Asia  is  a  reflection not  only of  its high population 
but  of  its swift  industrialization and  the  improvement  in  the  terms  of  trade 
for  manufactured  products.  According  to  UNIDO  statistics  manufacturing 
output  in  Asian  developing  countries  (excluding  China,  Vietnam  and  North 
Korea)  grew  at  an  annual  rate  of  8.5%  throughout  the  1980s,  compared  with  a 
growth  rate  of  just  3.6%  for  Latin  American  countries.  The  rise  in 
manufactured output  in Asia  in  the  1980s  represents  a  doubling of production 
in  nine  years.  The  Community's  GSP  scheme,  as  a  buttress  for  industrial 
development  in  accordance  with  its  stated  aims,  has  surely  played  a 
significant part  in this achievement,  particularly in the  early stages. 
The  position  of  the  least-developed  countries  (as  classified  by  the  UN, 
without  reference  to  the  Lome  Convention),  has  continued  poor;  in  1992, 
they  accounted  for  1. 2%  of  imports  from  beneficiaries  and  1.  7%  of  GSP 
benefits.  Even  more  worrying  is  the  fact  that  GSP  take-up  by 
least-developed  countries,  at  51.6%,  was  only  slightly  higher  than  the 
figure  for  GSP  beneficiaries  as  a  whole  (45.4%),  despite  their  freedom  from 
quotas  or ceilings.  This  highlights  the  need  for  further  effort  to  improve 
the  take-up  of  GSP  preferences  by  LLDCs,  though  the  scope  for  extending  the 
actual  coverage  is virtually nil,  as  98%  of  their  zero-duty  imports  already 
come  under  the  scheme  in  any  case.  Improvements  for  the  LLDCs  would  have  to 
be  sought  in  the  first  instance  via  changes  to  the  origin  rules  and  more 
efficient  administration  and  management  of  the  scheme.  Naturally,  the  most 
crucial  factor  in ensuring more  effective GSP  utilization by  these  countries 
is expansion of  the  offer. - 5  -
Giving  effect  to  the  Community's  Uruguay  Round  market-access  offer  reduces 
both  the  need  and  the  scope  for  significant  preferential  treatment  on 
several  product  categories.  On  aggregate  the  weighted  average  Community 
tariff  on  industrial  products  will  ultimately  be  cut  from  6.8%  to  4.1%,  a 
reduct ion  of  37%.  In  some  sectors  (construction,  equipment,  medical  and 
pharmaceutical  equipment,  furniture,  steel,  agricultural  equipment,  paper, 
toys,  beer  and  spirits)  duties  will  disappear  entirely;  in  others,  they 
will  be  aligned  with  other  countries'  tariffs  or  cut.  In  the  textile  and 
clothing sector quantitative  restrictions  are  to be  phased out,  even  though 
the  tariff  concessions  offered  by  some  of  the  supplier  countries  are  far 
from  adequate  and  talks  on  this  issue  are  therefore  continuing.  These 
changes  will  be  phased  in  only  gradually,  however;  for  most  sectors  there 
will  be  a  transition  period  of  five  years,  though  in  some  a  ten-year 
transition period has  been  agreed. 
GENERAL  GUIDELINES 
Introduction 
(a)  The  new  ten-year  scheme  assumes  that  the  level  of  liberalization  will 
be  neutral  overall  compared  with  the  existing  scheme  as  regards  the  impact 
of  the  preferential  margin  on  the  potential  volume  of  preferential  trade.1 
In  other  words,  it will  not  offer  additional  liberalization  over  and  above 
that  achieved  under  the  Uruguay  Round  combined  with  the  existing  GSP,  but 
nor  will it attempt  to claw back  the  Uruguay  Round  element. 
Starting  out  from  this  assumption  of  neutrality  the  offer  will  then  be 
modified  by  the  application  of  special  incentive  arrangements  providing 
supplementary preferences  consistent  with  the  Community's  development  aims. 
Thus,  incentive  arrangements  constitute  an  additional  offer  in  relation  to 
the  initial overall  neutrality. 
Surveillance  will  be  used  to  ensure  that  these  neutrality  criteria  are 
observed. 
(b)  The  new  ten-year  scheme  will  take  account  of  certain  sectors  or 
products  which  are  sensitive  for  Community  industry  and  agriculture. 
Because  of  the  extreme  sensitivity  of  fisheries  and  the  development  of 
second-generation fishery agreements,  the  scope of tariff reductions  in this 
sector  will  have  to  be  examined  very  carefully.  Sensitive  sectors  will  be 
protected  against  import  surges  not  by  differentiation,  as  they  are  at 
present,  but  by  a  dual  mechanism  involving  a  precautionary  modulation  of 
preferential tariff margins  structured to reflect product  sensitivity and  by 
an  emergency  safeguard  clause.  This  two-tier  system  would  replace  the 
machinery  of  quotas  and  ceilings  which  is  currently  used  to  effect 
country/product differentiation. 
1  In  technical  terms  this  means  that  the  financial  statement  drawn  up  to 
cover  the  operational  scheme  for  1995  will  incorporate  an  aggregate  GSP 
offer reflecting forecasts  for  the  effects of graduation  (based  on  the 
past preferential  performance  of  the  countries  concerned)  plus  the 
potential preferential trade of  countries  unaffected by graduation.  This 
should give  the  current  level  of preferential  trade. - 6  -
Both  tariff  modulation  and  the  safeguard  clause  must  fit  within  the 
framework  of  overall  neutrality  defined  above.  Overall,  therefore,  there 
will be  no  increase  in the proportion of sensitive products  in the  scheme. 
(c)  The  priority  for  the  new  ten-year  scheme  is  to  increase  export 
opportunities  on  the  Community  market  and  boost  actual  take-up  of 
preferences  for  the  "ordinary"  or least-developed developing countries.  The 
way  to'  do  this,  within  the  overall  framework  of  neutrality,  is  by 
graduation,  which  amounts  to transferring preferential  margins  from  advanced 
to  less-developed LDCs. 
that  is 
is  purely 
from  the 
Such graduation  no  long  as  anything  to do  with product  sensitivity; 
dealt  with  by  tariff  modulation  and  the  safeguard  clause.  It 
development-oriented  and  is  thus  radically  different 
country/product differentiation machinery  in use  at  the moment. 
(d)  The  new  graduation  mechanism  will  be  phased  in  gradually  to  allow 
traders  in  the  countries  concerned  and  in  the  Community  time  to  adjust  to 
the  new  GSP  offer and  thus  keep  within  the  framework  of  overall neutrality. 
1.  Simplification,  stabilization,  transparency 
The  principles  set  out  by  the  Commission  in  its  July 1990  Communication 
remain applicable to the  normal  GSP,  viz.: 
(a)  Simplification  (tariffication) 
Volume  restrictions  in  the  form  of  fixed  amounts,  tariff  quotas  or 
tariff ceilings  should  be  replaced by tariff modulation  reflecting the 
sensitivity of  different  sectors  (products  or  groups  of  products),  to 
be  decided  when  the  proposal  for  the operational  scheme  is drawn  up  in 
the  light  of  the  final  outcome  of  the  Uruguay  Round.  Modulation 
represents  the  EC's  main  line  of  defence  against  the  likelihood  of  a 
surge of preferential  imports  in certain sensitive sectors. 
Wherever  possible  the  degree  of  sensitivity  should,  for  ease  of 
administration,  be  determined  by  sector,  but  it  could  be  fine-tuned 
(down  to  product  level)  if  necessary.  It  should  be  assessed  on  the 
basis  of  objective  data  relating  to  the  Community  market  for  that 
sector  (import  penetration  rate,  productivity,  job  losses,  prices) 
irrespective of  the  source  of the  imports.  This  would  then enable us, - 7  -
for  the  purposes  of  the  operational  scheme,  to  draw  up  lists  of 
sensitive  and  non-sensitive  sectors  (products)  subject  to  different 
rates  of  preferential  duty  (e.g.  75%  of  the  MFN  rate  for  sensitive 
products  and  0%  or non-sensitive  products) . 
(b)  Stability 
Each  operational  scheme  within  the  ten-year  period  1995-2004  should 
run for  three years. 
(c)  Transparency 
A  special  product/country  safeguard  clause  is  needed  to  cope  with 
significant  unexpected  import  penetration  in  sensitive  lines,  as  a 
back-up  to  the  modulation  system.  It  should  be  based  on  the  test  of 
serious  damage  or  threat  of  serious  damage.  The  management  rules 
should be  modified  accordingly. 
2.  GSP  graduation 
Graduation  amounts  to  recognition  by  the  European  Union  that  some  third 
countries are  no  longer  in need of  GSP  benefits. 
It  should  represent  a  solution  to  the  problem  of  a  few  highly-competitive 
beneficiaries  hogging  the  lion's  share  of  total  GSP,  partly at  the  expense 
of  LLDCs. 
Because of  its political  implications  the  graduation machinery  would  have  to 
be  absolutely objective  and  acceptable  to our developing-country partners. 
The  existing  system  is  based  on  product/country  differentiation,  i.e.  the 
phasing  out  of  specific  product/country  combinations  on  the  grounds  of 
sensitivity of  the  product  for  Community  industry and  the  competitiveness  of 
the  exporting  countries.  It  allows  precise  targeting  but  this ·makes  it 
difficult  for  traders  and  customs  to  manage  and  raises  intractable 
statistical  problems.  To  keep  this  much-criticized  system  in  being  would 
therefore  be  inept.  What  is  more,  it  is  of  necessity  essentially  trade 
based  and  has  little latitude for  development  considerations. 
Broadly  speaking there  are  three  ways  of  achieving graduation:  by  excluding 
certain  highly-developed  countries,  by  excluding  certain  highly-sensitive 
sectors,  or  by  excluding  certain sectors  (or  product  groups)  in  the  case  of 
the  highest-performing countries. 
Exclusion of  the  highly-developed  countries  does  benefit  the  less-developed 
but  raises  economic  and political problems: - 8  -
the  countries  concerned  might  feel  strongly about  exclusion,  which  would 
distance  them  from  the  other  developing  countries  {in  the  G  77  and 
regionally) ; 
country graduation could  disrupt  regional  integration processes. 
Nevertheless,  some  current  GSP  beneficiaries  are highly-developed. 
Exclusion  of  sectors  impacts  purely  at  a  trade  level,  depriving  both  more-
and  less-developed countries of preferential access  to  the  Community  market, 
and it also has  other drawbacks: 
the  sectors  likeliest  to  be  affected  {textiles  and  footwear)  provide  the 
industrial  base  for  countries  in  the  early stages  of  industrialization  -
and  some  beneficiary  countries  are  still at  a  very  early  stage  indeed. 
Sector/country graduation offers  a  way  round this problem; 
it runs  counter  to  the  general  approach  adhered  to  in the  Uruguay  Round, 
which  aimed  to cover all sectors. 
The  Commission,  subject  to  a  detailed  assessment  of  the  actual  results 
emerging  from  the  1995  operational  scheme,  therefore  favours  the  third 
option,  sector/country graduation  as  being  the  most  balanced at  this  stage. 
However,  it  would  not  oppose  a  system  of  country  graduation  removing  GSP 
entitlement  from  certain  countries  on  the  grounds  of  their  advanced 
development.  This  would  follow  an objective,  non-discriminatory analysis of 
their situation in terms  of  the  level of development. 
Should  the  Council  opt  purely  for  the  sector/country  approach,  the 
Commission  does  not  feel  this  should  rule  out  full  graduation  of  certain 
beneficiary  countries  after  three  years  of  application  of  the  new  scheme, 
depending  on  how  the  jevel  of  those  countries'  overall  development 
progresses,  and  if  it  a~pears  that  the  more  highly-developed  LDCs  are 
failing to  allow  the  less-developed adequate  access  to their markets. 
What  would graduation by  sector/country consist of? 
The  sole  purpose  of  sector/country  graduation  is  to  increase  export 
opportunities  for  the  least-developed  countries  by  withdrawing  GSP 
entitlement  from  countries  which are both more  advanced  in their development 
and  stronger  in  certain  export  sectors  {including  agriculture  and  agri-
food),  and  thus  objectively no  longer  require  GSP  for  those  sectors,  thereby 
giving  a  boost  to  less  highly-performing  countries.  It  is  therefore 
development-oriented,  not  trade-oriented,  and  this  supports  the  distinction 
made  for  graduation purposes  between  advanced developing  countries,  ordinary 
developing  countries  and  LLDCs.  The  advanced  LDCs  are better able either to 
export  without  GSP  concessions,  once  they  have  attained  a  certain  level  of 
industrialization,  or  to  diversify  into  other  sectors  in  which  they  would 
retain  GSP  entitlement;  ordinary LDCs  are  more  dependent  on  GSP,  and  it is - 9 -
therefore  right  to  treat  them  with  greater  flexibility;  while  LLDCs  depend 
too  heavily  on  GSP  to  be  excluded  at  all.  Nevertheless,  this  focus  on  the 
different  needs  of  the  LDCs  in development  terms  should  not  blind us  to  the 
fact  that  advanced  and  ordinary  developing  countries  seeing  their  access  to 
GSP  restricted will  argue  that  they need  GSP  to offset  the  trade preferences 
granted  by  the  Community  to  the  ACP,  Mediterranean  countries,  and  Central 
and  Eastern  European  countries. 
These  considerations  dictate  that  country/sector  graduation  should  be 
applied sensibly and gradually. 
In  addition,  the  cumulative  origin  rules  should  be  used  to  ensure  that 
sector/country graduation  is  applied  in  such  a  way  as  to minimize  the  impact 
on  regional  integration when  one  member  of  a  regional  group  is affected. 
Even  when  a  country  loses  GSP  entitlement,  the  regional  cumulation  rules 
would,  in principle,  still apply  to  inputs  sourced  there  which  are  used  in 
other  countries  of  the  group.  In  other  words,  components  sourced  in  a 
"graduated"  country  incorporated  in  manufactured  products  in  another  member 
of  the  group  would  continue  to  be  treated  in  the  same  way  as  now; 
similarly,  products  eligible  for  GSP  originating  in  countries  of  a  regional 
group  which  transit  via  a  graduated  country  and  are  then  re-exported  after 
minimal  working  would  remain eligible for  GSP. 
(a)  Criteria 
These  are  based  on  relative  specialization,  coupled  with  a  development 
weighting. 
The  development  weighting  of  beneficiary  countries  is  determined  by  a 
development  index  combining  a  country's  per  capita  income  and  the  level 
of  its exports  as  compared  with  those  of  the  Community. 
Relative  specialization is  determined  by  a  specialization  index  based  on 
the  ratio  of  a  beneficiary country's  share  of  total  Community  imports  in 
general  to  its  share  of  total  Community  imports  in  a  given  sector.  The 
larger  the  sectoral  proportion  compared  with  the  general  proportion,  the 
greater the specialization. 
By  combining both criteria it is possible  to  adjust  the  crude  results of  the 
specialization index  in  terms  of  the  sectors  to be  excluded  in line with the 
level of  development. (b)  Solidarity mechanism 
We  have  noted  that  certain  beneficiary  countries  - including  some  in  the 
earlier  stages  of  development  - hog  the  lion's  share  of  GSP  benefits  in 
some  sectors.  The  sector/country  graduation  system  should  therefore  be 
supplemented  by  a  "solidarity  mechanism"  applicable  in  exceptional 
circumstances,  when  beneficiary countries  whose  exports  of  products  covered 
by  the  GSP  in  a  given  sector  exceeded  a  certain  percentage  (15-25%)  of  all 
beneficiaries'  exports  of  those  products  in  that  sector  would  be  excluded 
from  GSP  entitlement  for  that  sector  irrespective  of  their  level  of 
development. 
3.  Suspension of  GSP 
The  withdrawal  of  proportional  (total  or  partial)  preferences,  commensurate 
with  the  scale  of  the  phenomenon,  might  be  justified in  the  case  of  certain 
actions  or  omissions  on  the  part of beneficiary countries,  such as: 
fraud  or failure  to provide administrative  cooperation; 
unfair  trading practices,  including discrimination against  the  Community; 
practice of  any  form  of  slavery; 
export  of goods  made  by prison  labour; 
inadequate  controls  on  export  or  transit  of  drugs  (illicit substances  or 
precursors),  or money  laundering; 
failure  to  comply  with  obligations  entered  into  in  the  Uruguay  Round  to 
meet  agreed market-access  objectives. 
Withdrawal  would  not  be  automatic  but  would  follow  "hearings",  and  could  be 
applied  piecemeal  or  across  the  board.  In  any  case  GSP  would  be  suspended 
for  a  limited  period  only  (a  year)  and  the  "sentence"  would  have  to  be 
explicitly extended if the  country persisted with  the  "offence". 
4.  Special  incentives 
The  Commission  is  proposing  that  the  general  GSP  regime  should  be 
supplemented  by  special  incentive  arrangements,  with the  emphasis  on  social 
and  environment  schemes. 
The  special  incentives  should be positive  inducements  and  logical  components 
of  development  policy  in  that  they  reflect  the  idea  of  social  progress  and 
protection of  the  environment  as  aspects  of,  rather  than  preconditions  for, 
sustainable  development.  The  Community  could  also  contemplate  enhancing 
"basic"  GSP  benefits  so  that  they  provide  more  of  a  return  in  social  and 
environmental  terms  and  help  businesses  meet  the  extra  cost  of  progressive 
social  and  environmental  practices. - 11 -
A  similar system could be  used to encourage  developing  countries  to  speed up 
the  introduction  of  proper  protection  for  intellectual  property  rights,  a 
crucial stimulus  to  investment  and  trade. 
As  the  GSP  is  an  autonomous  instrument  the  Community  also has  some  margin  of 
manoeuvre  in  linking  additional  benefits  to  compliance  with  certain 
standards,  though  this  is  restricted  by  the  terms  of  the  GATT  enabling 
clause.  The  Commission  is  therefore  planning  to start  informal  exploratory 
talks  with  the  countries  concerned  to  ensure  that  the  parameters  of  this 
issue  are  clarified  before  the  Council  finalizes  its  scrutiny  of  the  draft 
1995  regulation. 
So  that  beneficiaries  can  gradually  gear  their  own  development  policies  up 
to  the  requirements of social progress  and protection of  the  environment  and 
will  thus  be  ready  to  derive  the  full  benefit  of  the  incentives,  the 
arrangements  would  really come  into  force  only once  the  new  scheme  had  been 
operating  for  two  years,  unless  international  agreement  is  reached  in  the 
meantime  to have  them  come  into  force  before  the  end of  the  two years. 
The  special  incentives will  operate  as  follows: 
1.  A  basic  preferential  margin  (expressed  in  this  case  as  a  percentage  of 
the  MFN  tariff)  will  be  granted  to  all  beneficiary  countries  under  the 
normal  GSP; 
2.  Under  the  special  incentive  arrangements,  i.e.  the  social 
environmental  clauses,  an  additional  margin  would  be  offered  to 
countries  submitting a  reasoned request  and stating that  they comply 




The  incentives  would  operate  entirely  on  the  basis  of  a 
product-certification  system.  Preferences  would  in  practice  be  granted 
only  for  products  certified  by  the  exporting  country  to  have  been 
manufactured  in  accordance  with  production  methods  and  in  conditions 
conforming  to  certain  internationally-recognized  standards  or  criteria. 
The  veracity  of  the  certificates  would  be  checked  by  means  of 
administrative  cooperation  with  the  exporting  countries  (certificates  to 
be  returned  for  verification  of  their  authenticity  and  the  accuracy  of 
the  particulars  they  contain,  with  on-the-spot  verification  if necessary 
in  important  cases).  Such  a  fair  and  objective  verification  procedure 
would  tend  to  resolve  any  disputes  by  actually  changing  the  offending 
practices rather  than by applying  a  penalty,  which  would  happen only  some 
time  later.  A  strengthening  of  the  investigative  machinery  should  be 
considered,  as  part  of  the  overall  evaluation  of  Commission  and  Member 
State resources  for  combating  fraud. - 12  -
A.  The  social clause 
This  would  refer  to  internationally-recognized  labour  standards,  i.e.  ILO 
conventions. 
Among  standards protected by  ILO  conventions,  those relating to  the  right  to 
organize  and  the  right  of  collective bargaining are  likeliest to bring about 
improvements  in  social  conditions  (better  wages  and  working  conditions)  and 
thus  help  raise  living  standards.  That  being  the  case,  the  additional 
incentives  available  under  the  social  clause  would  be  made  conditional  on 
genuine  implementation  of  the  principles  enshrined  in  these  conventions, 
irrespective of  whether  they have  been  formally ratified. 
The  incentive  social  clause  could  be  used  not  only  to  promote  the  right  to 
organize  but  also  against  practices  directly  linked  to  under-development, 
notably child labour. 
B.  The  environment  clause 
This  incentive  clause  would  be  used  to  promote  products  or  production 
methods  internationally  approved  as  consistent  with  the  objectives  set  out 
in  international  conventions  on  the  environment  (e.g.  on  the  ozone  layer, 
climate  and biodiversity)  and  in Agenda  21. 
The  additional  preferential  margin  would  be  granted  to  offset  the  extra 
costs of bringing  the  industries concerned  into line with these  standards  or 
criteria. 
The  environment  clause  would  initially  be  confined  to  tropical  wood 
products,  one  sector  in  which  international  criteria  have  already  been 
developed,  and  would  refer  to  the  criteria  laid  down  by  the  ITTO  for 
sustainable  forest  management.  It  would  apply  to  other  product  categories 
as  and  when  international  standards  or  criteria were  introduced  pursuant  to 
international conventions  on  the  environment  or Agenda  21. 
C.  Intellectual property rights 
New  rules  have  just  been  adopted  as  part  of  the  Uruguay  Round  package  but 
the  developing countries  have  been granted  a  breathing space  of  four  to nine 
years,  depending  on  subject matter,  before  they need  to  transpose  them  into 
domestic  law.  The  incentive  system  could  be  used  to  encourage  countries 
willing  to  implement  the  new  international  disciplines  far  enough  in advance,  and  might  help 
implementation  which  is, 
development  interests. 
D.  Other  incentives 
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overcome  local  political  resistance  to  faster 
in  any  case,  in  these  own  countries'  economic 
Other  incentives  could be  introduced,  particularly for structural adjustment 
and  commercial  policy  towards  other  developing  countries:  further  special 
concessions  (applying  to  all  GSP  beneficiaries)  could  be  granted  to 
countries  tackling reforms  in order to  meet  IMF  criteria or opening  up  their 
markets  to other developing countries. 
5.  Drugs 
The  Commission  considers  the  special  arrangements  aimed  at  the  fight  against 
drugs  should  be  continued,  provided  the  countries  concerned  for  their  part 
continue  their  efforts  to  combat  drugs  and  some  results  are  achieved. 
Progress  should  be  monitored  by  evaluation  and  dialogue,  via  a  suitable 
procedure  to  be  established  between  the  countries  concerned  and  the 
Commission. 
Pursuant  to  a  European  Council  recommendation,  the  special  arrangements 
currently  applying  to  the  Andean  Pact  and  Central  American  countries  are  to 
be  renewed  in  order  to  secure  the  full  benefits,  and  the  Commission  also 
advocates  a  limited  extension  of  the  scheme  to other  countries  in  a  similar 
situation. 
6.  List  of beneficiaries 
Save  for  possible application of  the  graduation machinery,  the  Commission  is 
not  otherwise  proposing  to  make  any  changes  to  the  list  of  current 
beneficiaries  for  at  least  three  years,  including,  as  an  interim 
arrangement,  the countries of  the  former  USSR  until  any  free-trade  agreement 
with  them  comes  into  force,  and  provided  they  undertake  to  open  their 
markets  to developing-country exports. 
South Africa  is to  be  included  in the  list on  terms  to be  worked  out. 
7.  The  GSP's  compatibility with  the  GATT  enabling clause 
Since  there  is  legal  uncertainty  about  the  compatibility of  the  new  features 
of  the  GSP  (graduation,  suspensions  and  special  incentives)  - and  indeed 
some  of  the  old  ones  (differentiation,  provisions  on  drugs)  - with  the 
informal  soundings  should  begin  GATT  enabling  clause,  within  the  OECD, 
Unctad  and  the  GATT  with  a  view  to  examining  the  consistency  of  enabling 
clause  and  the  principles  governing  the  Unctad  GSP  system with  the realities 
of  world  development  and  trade  today.  It  might  be  found  necessary 
ultimately  to  adapt  the  enabling  clause,  which  would  require  our  partners' 
agreement. - 14  -
Development 
A.  GSP-related technical assistance  and  trade  promotion 
To  make  sure  that  the  graduation  provision  works  properly  and  tilts the  GSP 
to  the  advantage  of  the  non-graduated  countries,  above  all  the 
least-developed  among  them,  technical  assistance  to  these  countries  should 
be  stepped up. 
This  could  be  done  by  organizing  more  information  seminars  in  these 
countries  and  enlarging  the  scope  of  such  seminars  to  cover  the  conditions 
of  access  to  the  Community  market,  by  increasing  the  Community  contribution 
to  Unctad  programmes  on  the  subject  and  by  making  special  assistance 
available  for  the  implementation of  the Uruguay  Round  conclusions. 
This  should  be  backed  up  by  more  intensive  trade  promotion  directly  linked 
to  GSP  use  (fairs,  market  research)  and  investment  promotion  (information on 
the  European  Community  Investment  Partners  (ECIP),  for  example) . 
Further  backing  would  take  the  form  of  aid  for  the  setting-up  of  producer 
groups  able  to  establish  direct  links  with  Community  importers,  and  also 
aimed at  improving  social  and  environmental  conditions. 
A  suitable  amount  for  this  purpose  should  be  entered  in  the  budget  from 
1995. 
B.  Accompanying  measures  linked  to  special  arrangements 
Funds  from  financial  and  technical  cooperation  are  already  allocated  to 
development  operations  that  may  be  considered  as  accompanying  measures  for 
the  special  incentive  schemes. 
Such  measures  could be  stepped up,  especially in the  following  fields: 
child education 
the  setting-up  of  structures  for  social  dialogue  and  training  of  trade 
unionists 
implementation of strategies  to  combat  drugs 
implementation of  environmental  protection measures - 15  -
CONCLUSIONS 
1.  Now  that  the  Uruguay  Round  has  been  concluded,  the  Community  needs  to 
update  the  GSP  by:  incorporating  performance  differentiation  for 
exporting  developing  countries;  taking  account  of  the  new  international 
situation and  institutional  changes  within  the  European  Union  itself;  and 
promoting  a  modern  concept  of  development  that  embraces  social  progress, 
environmental  protection and  an  open  international  economy. 
2.  Leaving  aside  the  additional  incentives,  the  future  scheme  should  be 
neither  more  nor  less  liberal  overall  than  the  present  arrangements,  but 
graduation  should  serve  to  target  its  benefits  on  the  less  competitive 
countries,  the  least-developed  in particular.  Technical  assistance  has  an 
important  back-up  role  to  play  in  ensuring  that  the  poorer  countries  use 
the  preferential  margins  accorded  by  the  Community  to  the  full  and  that 
they  also  diversify  their  export  markets  (i.e.  regional  markets  or 
markets  of  other  industrialized  parts  of  the  world) .  Lastly,  the  "donor 
country"  element  in  the  rules  of  origin  will  promote  a  process  of 
industrial  integration between  these  countries  and  the  Community. 
3.  Adjustments  in  the  ten-year  GSP  have  to  be  discussed  with 
preference-giving  countries  and  beneficiaries  within  GATT  and  Unctad  in 
Geneva.  Even  though  our  GSP  is  an  independent  scheme,  the  Community still 
needs  to  hold  talks  on  these  changes  to  ensure  that  they  are  understood 
and accepted. 